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of Being and Nothing
Rachel Aumiller
Marx somewhere remarks that history repeats itself: first as trag-
edy, then as farce. But what he failed to mention—what Hegel 
already knew—was that the historical doubling of tragedy and 
farce repeats itself: first as tragedy, then as farce.
In the opening act of the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, Karl Marx stages tragedy and farce as a historical 
duo, farce tripping directly into tragedy’s historical footprint 
(Marx 1960, p. 115). Marx states that although Hegel recognized 
that history repeats itself, he failed to see this historical doubling 
through the structures of tragedy and farce. Although Marx claims 
to make this addition to Hegel, we also might hear a bit of irony 
in his famous catchphrase, which is followed by an analysis drip-
ping with sarcasm, one-liners, and paradox. “First as tragedy, then 
as farce” has the ring of Abbott and Costello’s “Who’s on first? 
Who’s on first!” (Yarbrough et al. 1945) In the events of 1848, 
the Young Hegelians learned firsthand that what announces itself 
as comic revolution is often exposed as farce: tragedy wearing a 
comic mask. On a formal level, “first as tragedy, then as farce” 
appears on the historical stage as an odd couple like Abbott and 
Costello or Laurel and Hardy: a pair of opposites, one of which 
is always at the heels of the other. On the level of content, “first 
as tragedy, then as farce” is not the odd couple but identical twins, 
a mirroring of the same: Who’s on first? Who’s on first! Prior 
to the failures of 1848, the Young Hegelians anticipated that a 
revolution would erupt in the form of a comedy, demolishing 
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the tragic structures of their own historical stage. Marx was the 
first to introduce the concept in his 1842 essay on Prussian cen-
sorship (Marx 1956). In his first Young Hegelian “coming out” 
piece, Marx argues that the attitude of Prussian seriousness, which 
reinforces the status quo, must be countered with the humorous 
spirit of critique, which laughs in the face of that which was once 
revered. His older comrades eagerly responded with their own 
visions of comic revolution.1 Arnold Ruge, the most nuanced 
reader of Hegel amongst the group (once having been imprisoned 
for his controversial Hegelianism, allegedly served his five-year 
sentence happily reading Hegel and Greek poetry), was quick 
to identify the theme of comedy as a Hegelian concept. Ruge’s 
contribution challenged Marx’s initial oppositional framing of 
dogmatic seriousness and critical laughter. We cannot laugh down 
the object of critique from a critical distance. Comedy, as simply 
opposed to tragedy, reveals itself to be a farce: a formal break that 
preserves the content of that which comes before it. Historical 
comedy can only erupt when tragedy, grasping itself by its own 
contradiction, can no longer take itself seriously.2
Not only did Hegel himself already frame historical repetition 
as a theatrical production, but he took Marx’s formulation of the 
historical double (tragedy and farce) one step further, multiplying 
“first as tragedy, then as farce” times two: first as tragedy, then 
as farce, now once more only this time comically. We see (2 x 2) 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 1970) in Hegel’s analysis 
of “Art-Religion” and “Revealed Religion.” Greek tragedy and 
comedy are repeated in the divine drama of Christianity: first, in 
the tragedy of the incarnation in which contradiction is  attributed 
to one tragic hero, then in the comedy of the crucifixion in which 
1 See, for example, Stirner 1983, pp. 327-53, and Ruge 1983, pp. 211-36.
2 Ruge thus does not identify religion as the object of laughter/critique 
but rather as potential site for tragic contradiction—the corrupt relationship 
between Church and State—to grasp the absurdity of its own farcical nature 
and erupt in a subversive comedy (Ruge 1983, pp. 229-236).
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the very same contradiction is revealed as belonging to all.3 In 
Marx’s second formulation of critique and comedy, which he 
again positions against Hegel, he claims that the ancient gods had 
to die twice: once tragically and then once again comically.4 But in 
Hegel’s own analysis, the double death of the ancient gods had to 
occur twice more so that God the Absolute could grasp his own 
tragic contradiction and erupt in comedy.5 What is played out on 
the dramatic stages of art and religion enacts an ontological drama 
in the opening of Hegel’s Science of Logic. (2 x 2) also occurs as the 
redoubling of the original comic duo: Being and Nothing (Hegel 
1986a, p. 82). As Hegel frames it, Being and Nothing are already 
from the beginning redoubled: “Being, pure Being…Nothing, pure 
Nothingness.”6 This passage, as I will explore, holds itself open 
allowing the ontological double to be redoubled in several ways.
Sigmund Freud identifies the figure of the double as produc-
ing an uncanny effect. As he argues, das Unheimliche traditionally 
describes an encounter with something quite strange, some form 
of sinister opposition that threatens to snuff out one’s existence 
(Freud 1999). But the chill that runs over my skin at the uncanny 
encounter is not due to the strangeness of this other but instead 
comes from a repressed familiarity. My opposite turns out to be my 
mirror image, although I may not recognize myself in its reflection. 
Freud positions the double not as between tragedy and comedy, 
but as between comedy and horror. (Marx’s philosophy of the his-
torical double of tragedy and farce similarly slips into horror with 
revolutions fought by ghosts and zombies.) Freud puzzles over the 
double, recognizing that although in one context the double chills 
3 For another account of Hegel’s analysis of the life and death of Christ as 
the double of Ancient theater, see Hegel 1986b.
4 On the double death of the gods, see Marx 1956, p. 382.
5 For a similar reading of Hegel’s staging of Christ as an elevation of Greek 
comedy, see Zupančič 2008, pp. 44-60. 
6 In this context, I made the decision to capitalize Being and Nothing to 
treat them like stage characters, comparing them to comic duos known by their 
proper names, Laurel and Hardy.
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us, in another context the double strikes us as funny. He concludes 
that the experience of standing face-to-face with our own double 
creeps us out, because we cannot recognize that this other is a rep-
etition of something that has already occurred or something that is 
already present within myself or someone who is no different than 
myself.7 But when the double is reproduced (in art for example), 
we are able to recognize something about the double that was for-
merly too close for comfort. The “ghastly multiplication” (ibid., 
p. 252) of the double allows for a certain recognition to come to 
the surface. What was once uncanny produces a burst of laughter.
Following Freud’s analysis of the fragile line between the 
uncanny double and its comic redoubling, I identify the doubling 
of the double found in critical moments of Hegelian dialectic as 
producing a kind of comic effect. It almost goes without saying 
that two provides greater pleasure than one, the loneliest number. 
Many also find two to be preferable to three, the tired trope of 
dialectic as a teleological waltz. Two seems to offer lightness, re-
lieving one from her loneliness and lacking the complications of 
a third who comes in between. And yet, we learn through Marx 
and Freud that the double (even the double of tragedy and farce) 
borders on something closer to horror than comedy. In the fol-
lowing, I would like to explore why four is funnier than two in 
my staging of dialectic as the doubling of the double or, to borrow 
a movie title from Laurel and Hardy, “Twice Two” (Roach et al. 
1933a). I will begin by exploring the formulations of the double in 
the form of a pair of opposites and in the form of a pair of twins. 
The literary tropes of the double as the odd couple, on one side, 
and the twins, on the other, appear to serve very different narrative 
functions, which incite different kinds of affective responses from 
the audience. However, the form of the opposed double sometimes 
conceals the realization that the empty or fragmented content of 
the first is only reduplicated in the second. The “straight man” of 
7 On the comic effect and the double see Freud 1999, pp. 236, 245, and 252.
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the odd couple cannot see himself in his counterpart “the comic.” 
The redoubling of the double, however, forces not only the audi-
ence, but the original double on stage to confront what was already 
present, but unrealized, from the beginning. To illustrate this 
redoubling of the double within the opening of Hegel’s Science of 
Logic, I consider two short films by Laurel and Hardy in which the 
comic duo redoubles itself. The formula (2 x 2) produces a comic 
excess through the dialectical redoubling of there uncanny double.
Double It
Chewing Gum and The Mirror Phase—Autoeroticism Times Two
A dramatic duo comes in two varieties: in the form of twins—two 
of the same—and in the form of the odd couple—a pair of opposites 
who are two in one. In both cases, the second figure of the set of 
two seems to relieve the first from her tragic nature. The spirit of 
gravity—represented by the first of the pair—appears to be elevated 
by the spirit of frivolity—introduced by the second. However, 
although two (at first) may seem to be more fun than just one, two 
can also be slightly creepy. We experience this feeling while in the 
presence of obsessive lovers who threaten to annihilate each other 
in their passion. And yet although two may have the tendency 
to lose their initial appeal, twice two produces a hilarious effect.
Let’s consider the old Doublemint gum commercials with the 
unforgettable imperative: “Double your pleasure! Double your 
fun!” The first commercial for Doublemint chewing gum aired in 
1959. A woman sits in front of her vanity intently gazing into her 
reflection as she combs her hair. She stands and turns away from her 
vanity. Her reflection follows her! To her delight her reflection is 
revealed to belong to another figure with her exact appearance and 
form. Wrigley’s Doublemint gum twins are born in this moment 
when the lonely girl finds a perfect companion in her reflection that 
comes to life. The moment when one is revealed as two appears to 
be delightful. One will never be alone again now that she is two. 
When the 1980s rolled around, Wrigley decided that the twins 
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weren’t really all that fun anymore. The fantasy of the twins at 
first had sex appeal, but at the end of the day there was something 
unsettling about the ultimately autoerotic nature of the girl who 
had only her reflection for companionship. Rather than imagin-
ing oneself erotically positioned between the two playful sisters, 
the viewer instead sees herself in the girl blowing bubbles alone in 
front of the mirror. Although one is revealed to be two, two are 
also still one. The original incompleteness of the one was merely 
doubled in two, although this repeated inadequacy was masked 
by the appearance of completeness offered by the missing half.
[IMAGE 1] [IMAGE 2]
Fig. 1 and Fig. 28
8 Joan and Jayne Knoerzer in Wrigley’s Doublemint Gum (1959) com-
mercial. All rights reserved. Courtesy of Mars, Inc.
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Just as minty-fresh was losing its flavor, Wrigley found its 
marketing solution within the tagline of its own slogan: “Come 
on and double it!” In the early commercials, silhouettes of two 
identical men appear in the background or foreground in the 
position that the audience occupies. The new campaign brought 
the boys to the same playing field as the girls, making all four 
figures objects of pleasure. The girls were redoubled in their 
male counterparts, finding lovers at last in the redoubling of the 
first autoerotic double. In doubling the twins, the original one’s 
loneliness or fragmented nature is not overcome. But the audience 
can take pleasure in the absurdity of what was initially pitiful if 
not creepy: the girl’s mistaken sense of completeness found in her 
reflection. In shifting her object of desire from her own reflection 
to one found in the world, the first girl seems to overcome her 
isolation. And yet it seems all too obvious that the twin girls fall 
immediately in love with the twin boys simply because they see 
themselves in their male doubles. The same may be said of the 
boys’ attraction to the girls.
We might consider the development of the Doublemint girl 
who discovers a perfectly symmetrical companion in her reflection 
through what Jacques Lacan identifies as “The Mirror Stage.”9 
Lacan defines the mirror phase as an early pre-linguistic stage in 
which the infant gains a sense of “self” through its identification 
with its reflection. Prior to recognizing itself in the mirror, the 
infant could only observe itself through fragmented moving parts 
of its body (its hands or its toes). When the infant shifts from a 
fragmented body-image to an image of itself as a totality, it gains 
a permanent sense of self. This sense of self, however, is rooted in 
this “double” that is inverted and distorted in size. As the infant 
matures, it shifts from the spectral ego based in the mirror-image 
to a social ego based in its dialectical grasp of itself through the 
other. These two phases of the ego—in which we grasp our 
9 For one formulation of the mirror phase see Lacan 2007.
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self through the mirror-image and in which we grasp ourselves 
through the other in the world—may appear to be opposed. Yet, 
Lacan claims that the individual will continue to relate to herself 
and her environment imperfectly throughout her life, since there 
will always be a certain disjunction between her physical reality 
and the inverted double through which she grasps both herself 
and the world.
In the case of the Doublemint girl, the discovery of her 
double initially offers her a sense of completeness, but her se-
curity quickly gives way to a sense of uneasiness. To overcome 
this uneasiness, she seeks security not in her mirror image but in 
a form quite different from her own. And so the twin girls are 
partnered with the twin boys. The disjunction between the two 
sisters, whose relationship ultimately leaves something to be de-
sired, is also the disjunction between the first girl and herself. We 
might speculate that the uncanny nature of the second girl lies in 
the fact that she is not perfectly identical; her actions are inverted. 
The uncanny nature would thus lie in this slight difference, this 
sense of something being slightly off. But we may also speculate 
that the uncanny nature of the second does not lie in difference 
but sameness, as the first twin recognizes a disjunction in herself 
that is not filled but only magnified by the presence of her twin.
Wrigley’s campaign found success in the familiar comic trope 
of the double-double, a trope that Shakespeare employed fre-
quently in his comedies. The two sets of twins in The Comedy of 
Errors, for example, allow for “double the pleasure” by doubling 
the trouble with more possibilities for confusion, misidentifica-
tions, inversions, and the old “switch-a-roo” (Shakespeare 1988). 
But why does the first double become funnier in its redoubling? 
What does the doubling of the double do to the first double? My 
suggestion is that the dialectical process of doubling the double 
reveals something that was already true about the relationship of 
the first duo. Something or, more precisely, nothing new emerges 
in the relationship between the split in the first double and the 
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doubling of the split itself in the second double. The addition 
of the boys of course does not fill the gap between one and two 
(which is to say, between one and one) but rather represents a 
shift from the first girl’s imperfect relationship with herself to her 
imperfect relationship to the world. In a sense, nothing changes 
in the doubling of the double. But in another sense, the first un-
dergoes transformation. In the redoubling, the first one is able 
to recognize the disjunction in herself as something she cannot 
overcome. Instead, in grasping the disjunction outside of herself 
as something that exists between the two brothers, she has the 
opportunity to recognize the disjunction as constitutive of her 
subjectivity. The uncanny thus may be experienced in a moment 
of comic relief.
Two Peas in a Pot10
The Tragedy of One—One becomes Two—Twins vs. the Odd Couple—
The Game of “Not”
One is the subject of tragedy. As Antonin Artaud argues in The-
ater and its Double, the content of tragedy is that which is abso-
lutely singular, that which cannot be repeated or represented by 
another (Artaud 1994). Hegel also defines tragedy by oneness, but 
for him the oneness of tragedy is the joke of comedy: comedy is 
the process of exposing the oneness of tragedy as farce. The tragic 
figure sees herself from the start as an absolute singularity. Her 
conviction to her ethical ideals pits her against the world. She is 
tragic, however, not because she must die at the hands of the world 
10 This heading comes from a famous Stan Laurel malapropism in Sons of 
the Desert (Roach et al. 1933b). Stan is searching for the expression “two peas 
on a pod” to describe himself and Ollie, but accidentally stumbles upon the 
charming malapropism “two peas in a pot.” Stan’s malapropisms always seem 
to hit the nail on the head. The suggestion here is that two who are too close 
for comfort are likely to get each other in deeper trouble, like two peas in a 
boiling pot of water.
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that refuses to see the rightness of her conviction. Her tragedy is 
instead in her one-sidedness: her inability to see that the ethical 
action that is demanded by her deeply personal conviction is also 
an impersonal product of the system that she believes she opposes. 
On the other side of the tragic hero is the one who protects the 
unity of the whole and demands the challenger’s death. This one 
opposed to the first one fails to see that the transgression of the 
outsider is also demanded by the ethical system he protects. What 
appears to be the loneliest number is a logical absurdity, because 
there are always two tragic heroes who mirror each other even in 
(especially in) their opposition. Tragedy can only see itself from 
the eyes of the hero on one of the sides of its conflict. It tries to 
maintain the absurdity of its ultimate Oneness by killing the one 
who is identified as introducing conflict. The conflict however 
does not belong to the outsider—who is not an outsider at all—
but belongs instead to the stage itself. Tragedy cannot see that the 
crack that divides one and one is that which constitutes the stage. 
Tragic blindness is blindness to the perspective of the blind spot 
itself: the nonperspective of the crack.11
The tragic perspective does not see that the figure of the 
double is always already lurking within one. Farce, to use Marx’s 
terms, presents itself as comic relief but is as blind as tragedy to the 
crack within one. It sees tragedy as the loneliest one and attempts 
to relieve tragic alienation by providing one with a companion. 
And so, one becomes two either through a sister who is the same 
(as in the Doublemint gum commercial) or through a companion 
who is her missing half, her opposite who is not opposed but who 
makes her whole (girl meets boy). As we see in Aristophanes’s 
myth of the circle people from Plato’s Symposium, two of the same 
as well as two opposites hopelessly struggle to overcome their 
incompleteness by attempting to mend the crack between them 
11 Hegel on the two tragic sides that mirror each other: Hegel 1970, pp. 
539-40.
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(Symp. 189c-193e). The twin, as I have already claimed, has the 
appearance of providing great fun for the loneliest one. The twin 
enters the private world of the one and shares the one’s personal 
convictions and senses of pleasure that appear to be only one’s 
own. There are many comedies that revolve around the playful-
ness of twins. However, although twins have been taken up as the 
subject of comedy, they are also the subject of horror: we think 
immediately of the twin sisters who haunt the halls of Overlook 
Hotel. In movies, such as The Parent Trap (1961), one finds great 
pleasure in the discovery of a lost other who is as familiar as 
her self. But this same plot also produces a chilling effect when 
one discovers the other who is no different from one’s self. The 
horror of The Shining (Kubrick et al. 1980) does not lie in Jack’s 
encounter with ghosts from the past, but rather in his encounter 
with himself as his own split identity comes to the surface.
The comic-horror of the figure of the double is illustrated 
nicely by the film Single White Female (Schroeder et al. 1992). 
The story opens with Allie Jones who kicks her fiancé out of 
their apartment after she discovers he has cheated on her with his 
ex-wife. Allie’s appearance of fierce individuality, represented by 
her distinctive spunky red haircut, sets her up as the tragic hero. 
She maintains her independence although she is alone in the Big 
City, surrounded by predatory older male figures. Allie posts an 
ad for a roommate and finds relief from her isolation in Hedy 
Carson. When Hedy moves in the girls quickly become as close 
as sisters (Hedy mentions that her own twin died at birth). The 
girls complement each other in their differences. Each becomes 
the other’s missing half. Sisterly giggles are exchanged as they fix 
their broken plumbing, raise a puppy, and swap clothing. There 
is, at first, an air of lightness when one becomes two and two 
are fused into one. However, the problem with the one-two-one 
formula is that in the process of joining two, one side tends to 
absorb the other into itself. The sister eats her twin. The tone 
of the film changes when the girls go to a salon to get their hair 
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cut. As Allie admires herself in the mirror she catches a glimpse 
of Hedy descending the staircase of the salon, sporting Allie’s 
signature red bob haircut.
[IMAGE 3]
Fig. 312
12 Single White Female © 1992 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. All 
Rights Reserved. Courtesy of Columbia Pictures.
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The scene is a dark double of the Doublemint gum com-
mercial, in which the reflection comes to life. The lightness of 
sister play descends into horror as Hedy quickly takes over Al-
lie’s identity and eventually attempts to snuff out her existence 
altogether. We learn that Hedy in fact killed her real twin and 
now seeks redemption by repeating the murder. Allie begins to 
experience her relationship with Hedy as uncanny not simply 
because Hedy is revealed to be something other than what she 
initially seemed (not a shy, sweet girl, but a serial killer). Allie 
experiences the relationship as uncanny, because this other takes 
the form of something that is all too familiar, a figure who be-
comes indistinguishable from Allie herself. It becomes clear to 
both girls that there is not room for two. Despite the appearance 
of fusion, there is still the first or the original who is threatened 
to be displaced by the secondary copy. But which one is which? 
In the final scene, Hedy and Allie fight to the death. Which one is 
original and which one is copy is of no matter. The victor emerges 
when one side of the double is destroyed.13
The trope of the odd couple produces a different dramatic 
tone than the trope of the twins. As we have seen, two of the same 
can be funny or horrifying depending on how the two-fused-in-
one are staged. However, there is something inescapably comic 
about the difference between two opposites fused into one, as 
proven by great double acts such as George Burns and Gracie 
Allen. Even when the odd couple plays the role of the villain, 
13 This fight to the death illustrates what makes dialectical repetition dis-
tinct from postmodern repetition. In postmodern repetition, there is no longer 
any claim to originality. Dialectical repetition is characterized by a tension pro-
duced between two, each of which seem to have equal claim to the position of 
the first. And yet, it is impossible to decide which side is referent and which side 
is signifier. In my view, the repetition of the first double in the second double 
(the movement from 2 to 4) does not overcome this tension, but rather allows 
for a new affective response to the tension between two. The fight to the death 
of one of the two sides also does not overcome the tension, since in the greatest 
irony one is shown to be already two.
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the comic chemistry of the duo shines through. The first figure 
of the odd couple, as in the case of the first of the twins, fits the 
mold of the tragic hero. The first is typically narrow-minded 
and stubborn, hotheaded and quick to anger. He shakes his fist 
at the world which he must conquer with his small-minded plans 
lest the world destroy him. He is blinded by his one-sidedness. 
Unto himself this frustrated isolated figure is not very funny 
at all, but instead rather pathetic. And yet, when the spirit of 
gravity is paired with its opposite—the spirit of frivolity—the 
tragic nature of the first seems to be defused. Figure one repre-
sents order, necessity, fate, and essence: both what is and what 
ought to be. Figure two, in contrast, represents play, possibility, 
contingency, and accident: both what may be and what is not. 
One is absolute and one is not. At each step the second figure 
trips up the fatalism of the first. At each turn the seriousness and 
severity of the first is mocked by the silliness of the second. The 
tragedy of the first is constantly overturned by his comic double 
who is the immediate repetition of his every movement. Like 
the broom-faced sweeper dog from Alice in Wonderland (Walt 
Disney Productions et al. 1951), the comic double immediately 
sweeps away the tracks of tragedy.
But is the tragic nature of the first one really overcome by 
the comic cleanup man? Hegel saw Greek comedy on the an-
cient stage not as comic relief from tragedy but as a mirror of the 
tragic stage. As he puts it, the reconciliation on the comic stage of 
Greek history is superficial or partial freedom (Hegel 1970, pp. 
541-45). On the ancient tragic stage, the grave hero steps before 
the chorus to defend the absolute rightness of her actions. She 
soberly utters, “It is. It must be. It cannot be undone.” The tragic 
hero solemnly sacrifices herself in the name of her gods, which 
she represents. On the comic stage, we drag the gods out onto the 
stage and make them represent themselves. We laugh as they are 
tortured and mocked and cry: “The gods are dead! All that was 
no longer is. It is not.” The double in the form of the odd couple 
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represents these two stages on one stage. The tragic utterance “It 
is.” is immediately met with the comic proclamation “It is not!”
We children of the 1990s played an incredibly obnoxious 
game in which we would interrupt someone’s speech yelling 
“NOT!”14 In fact, it was much more than a game. It was both our 
ethical duty and sick compulsion to scream “NOT” in someone’s 
face the moment they opened their mouth. The comic double op-
erates on this game of “NOT!” One says, “It is.” Two responds, 
“Not.” “It is.”—“Not.”
                         (It is | Not)         |     (It is | Not)
(Being | Nothing)  |  (Being | Nothing)
The immediate movement from the tragic one to the comic 
double reflects the first movement of Hegel’s Science of Logic. 
Following Hegel, we begin with what would appear to be the 
most fundamental category of thought: pure Being without 
further determination. We begin with Being but the moment we 
try to point to Being—to determine what it is that Being might 
be—we arrive at its negative double, Nothing. This is so since the 
content of pure Being—indeterminate immediacy—cannot be 
distinguished from the emptiness of pure nothingness. A radical 
change appears in the immediate movement from Being to Noth-
ing—from the spirit of gravity to the spirit of frivolity—from 
“It is” to “It is not”—from tragic seriousness to comic laughter. 
However, insofar as these two stages appear as simply opposed 
(even as they appear on the same stage) the relationship between 
one and (not) one fails to show us anything new. The radical 
change in appearance is a mere repetition of the empty contents of 
the pure forms. Insofar as the two appear to be simply opposed, 
14 The game of “Not!” became popular in North America through the Sat-
urday Night Live sketch “Wayne’s World,” later produce as a movie in 1992. That 
same year, The American Dialect Society selected “Not!” as the word of the year.
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we miss the biggest joke of philosophy: according to logic itself, 
Being and Nothing cannot be the same, and yet we cannot logi-
cally distinguish one from the other.
One can understand this crisis as belonging to the logician 
who cannot distinguish the pure form of Being from the pure 
form of Nothing. But one can also imagine this identity crisis as 
belonging from the beginning to Being itself. From this perspec-
tive, the Logic begins with a depiction of “the mirror phase” of 
Being’s development. In other words, “the beginning” is in Being’s 
repeated failed attempt to grasp its own identity as something that 
is whole and complete. Being tries to grasp itself both in its mirror 
image and in the image of its negative counterpart. In one reading 
of this passage, Being appears in the form of the odd couple: Being 
and Nothing. Hegel redoubles the odd couple when he replays 
the movement from Being to Nothing backwards, this time start-
ing from Becoming and moving from Nothing (or non-Being) to 
Being (Hegel 1986a, p. 84). It is as if Being passes by a mirror and 
is chilled by its missing reflection. Nothing likewise attempts to 
reflect on itself as pure nothingness and is startled by the image 
of its uncanny double, Being. Thus, Being and Nothing try again 
to grasp themselves, but this time as an ontological compound 
of Being and Nothing. And yet even as a compound, Being and 
Nothing can only grasp themselves imperfectly through a reflec-
tion that is inverted. In this way, I read Being and Nothing as the 
odd couple that is redoubled and inverted in Nothing and Being.
The originary redoubling of the odd couple may also be read 
as the redoubling of twins. As Mladen Dolar points out in his 
provocative reading of The Science of Logic, titled “Being and 
MacGuffin,” “Being, pure Being” is already split by a comma 
and repeated:
One could say: in the beginning there is being posited twice, or in 
the beginning there is a gap in being, a gap between the first and 
second being, splitting the being from itself, by the sheer cunning-
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ness of its grammatical structure. […] The minimal rhetorical de-
vice is precisely repetition, introducing redundancy, the surplus of 
rhetoric over “information.” Saying something twice is redundant, it 
doesn’t bring new information […]. But the rhetorical at this point 
has immediate ontological value, it is the rhetoric of being itself, 
which makes that being insist before ever properly “existing,” it 
insists as a repetition and a cut. The minimal, for being pure, is a 
redoubled minimal. (Dolar 2017, pp. 92-93)
Being is already from the beginning its own double, even 
“before” Being loses itself in the image of its negative double. As 
I see it, this splice and repetition within pure Being allows Being 
to fold onto itself in an originary, although imperfect, self-relation. 
Being tries to reflect upon itself but can only grasp itself by the 
disjunction between itself and its double.15 The first set of onto-
logical twins is mirrored in the second set of twins: “Nothing, pure 
Nothingness.” Nothing appears as a radical negation of Being, 
but it is instead nothing more and nothing less than the repeated 
content of Being. The content of pure Being from this perspective 
is not nothing in the form of emptiness, but rather negativity in 
the form of the comma, the splice, the disjunction, or the split.
(Being | Nothing)  |  (Nothing | Being)
                      (Being | Being)       |  (Nothing | Nothing)
In my interpretation, this originary crack or stutter in pure 
Being is heightened when repeated in pure Nothing. In fact, the 
only content of pure Being and pure Nothing is the stutter itself. 
The disturbance that causes Being to interrupt and repeat itself 
is echoed in Nothing. The comma represents a stirring in Being 
that is mirrored in the stirring in Nothing: a negative glitch within 
indeterminate negativity. The difference between one and one in 
15 A comic double of Aristotle’s absolute as thought thinking itself (see 
Met. 12.1072b.20). Here thought attempts to think itself but its mind goes blank. 
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the case of the twins (Being and Being or Nothing and Nothing) 
and one and one in the odd couple (Being and Nothing or Noth-
ing and Being) is only formal. In both cases, the redoubling of 
the double magnifies an active negativity—a repeated stutter or 
glitch—in the stillness of pure emptiness. The second ontological 
double magnifies something—or rather nothing—that was there 
from the beginning. In the beginning was the stutter. In the be-
ginning was the glitch.16
Nothing Changes
The Doubling of the Comic Double—The Crack in the Crack
Comedy teaches us how to count to four: One—Charlie Chaplin, 
Two—Abbott and Costello, Three—The Three Stooges, Four—
The Marx Brothers.17 But the comic dialectician begins with the 
double to count to four.18 To illustrate this dialectical doubling 
of the double through comedy, I conclude by turning to the 
classic comic duo, Laurel and Hardy. Oliver Hardy was a large 
280-pound man who wore a bowler hat and suit that were slightly 
too small, while Stan Laurel was a slim man who wore a bowler 
hat and suit that were slightly too large. Ollie played the role of 
the serious man who was easily frustrated. He saw himself as the 
more intelligent of the two, although he constantly led the two 
into pitfalls. Stan, Hardy’s easygoing sidekick, played the role of 
16 A sort of origin story that constantly interrupts itself and restarts: it is a 
beginning that cannot quite be expressed in a full sentence (Gen. 1:3), but also 
requires more than a single word, since the word is already repeated (John 1:1); 
it is at the same time less than a single word since it is no more than the gap 
between the repetition.
17 Thanks to Aaron Schuster for counting to four with me through clas-
sic comic cinema.
18 Slavoj Žižek also recognizes the quadruplicity in the Logic but offers 
a different suggestion of how a dialectician may count to four with Hegel (see 
Žižek 1991).
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the simpleton. As Nabokov describes him, “[Stan was] wonder-
fully inept, yet so very kind” (Appel 1971, p. 213). While Ollie 
easily loses his temper, Stan easily bursts into tears. And yet Stan, 
who appears so fragile and naïve always seems to come out on top 
without even trying. His mere presence causes Ollie—the spirit 
of gravity—to self-sabotage. In every episode, Ollie, thinking 
he knows best, forcefully pushes Stan out of the way and takes 
the lead. Ollie of course walks directly into disaster, while Stan 
remains unscathed.
The chemistry between Laurel and Hardy reflects the dy-
namics between the spirit of gravity and the spirit of frivolity. 
However, there are two Laurel and Hardy shorts that intensify the 
formula of the odd couple times two. Through an early experiment 
with overlaying film, the two play themselves and their doubles. 
First as tragedy, then as farce is fully played out as first as tragedy, 
then as farce: redoubled. In the 1933 short, “Twice Two,” Laurel 
and Hardy marry each other’s sisters, also played by the duo, in 
a double wedding. In the opening scene, the men call their wives 
from work. The usual slapstick that takes place between Laurel 
and Hardy is mirrored in the antics between their female coun-
terparts who are at home preparing an anniversary dinner. Hardy 
is squirted in the face with black ink while the female Hardy 
gets a cake in the face. Initially the dynamic between Laurel and 
Hardy is only paralleled by the dynamic between the sisters. But 
the dynamic is complicated when all four sit down to the table 
together. Laurel sits across from the female version of himself (an 
exact replica in drag) and next to the female version of Hardy (his 
opposite in drag). Hardy likewise sits across from his female twin 
and next to his female opposite. The anniversary dinner begins 
with two sets of twins sitting at the table, each twin looking into 
his or her near reflection. But over the course of the dinner, four 
different combinations of the odd couple emerge: Laurel and 
Hardy, the female Laurel and female Hardy, Laurel and female 
Hardy, and Hardy and female Laurel. The traditional dynamic 
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between Laurel and Hardy operates on a movement that oscillates 
to and fro from one to two to two to one, like an endless game 
of fort-da between Being and Nothing, a game in which nothing 
changes. The dinner table, which stages the double-double, also 
features a ping-ponging of bickering and slapstick between one 
and one’s opposite. The exchange is always between some version 
of Laurel and Hardy, but never the exact same combination of 
Laurel and Hardy. Even when nothing changes, the movement 
from one back to the other is not exactly the same. As Dolar puts 
it, “One cannot step into the same being twice” (Dolar 2017, 92).
[IMAGE 4]
Fig. 419
The 1930 short “Brats” is a rare instance in which Laurel and 
Hardy carry out the entire plot without the aid of any other actors. 
19 Twice Two (1933). James Parrott. MGM. Pictured: Stan Laurel and Oli-
ver Hardy (Image Credit: Snap).
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And yet double is not alone on stage. Laurel and Hardy redouble 
themselves, this time playing both the roles of Stan Sr. and Ollie 
Sr. and the roles of their sons Stan Jr. and Ollie Jr. (Roach et al. 
1930). While their wives are out hunting ducks, the men are given 
the womanly task of watching the children. The scene opens with 
a game of checkers. Ollie is determined to win although Stan has 
already captured a large stack of Ollie’s red checker pieces. Like 
a game of “NOT” in which children negate each other’s words 
almost before they leave the other’s mouth, Stan jumps to make a 
move the moment Ollie’s hand hovers over a checker piece. When 
Stan is distracted, Ollie quickly makes his play. Stan immediately 
captures two mores pieces. It is. It is Not. It is Not. After pausing 
to look sternly into the camera, Ollie begrudgingly advances one 
of his pieces. It is. The spirit of gravity plays the spirit of frivolity 
at a game of checkers. This scene has a dark double in Bergman’s 
The Seventh Seal (Bergman et al. 1957) in which Antonius faces 
Death in a game of chess. But Stan and Ollie do not play chess 
but rather a round of children’s checkers, which Ollie nevertheless 
treats very seriously. The game of checkers is redoubled in the 
children games in which the boys too go back and forth. In a game 
of building blocks, the boys take turns placing one block upon the 
other. The boys gain speed until Stan Jr.’s block lands on Ollie Jr.’s 
finger, resulting in a violent crash of the block tower (the crash 
is of course the telos of a game of building blocks). The formula 
seen in checkers and building blocks is repeated twice more: the 
boys take turns grasping the long neck of a glass vase placing one 
hand over the other’s hand. This game predictably ends with the 
crashed vase. Finally, a game of tag is proposed, otherwise known 
as “It,” which ends before it can begin. For a game of “You’re it.” 
immediately becomes a war of “Not it!” “Not it!”
Between one and two there is a change in form but not in 
content, since It and Not are initially indistinguishable, but cre-
ate what would appear to be a changeless movement to and fro. 
In the mirroring of this movement in the second double there is 
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[IMAGE 5] [IMAGE 6]
Fig. 5 and Fig. 620
20 Fig. 5. Image title: Jan. 1, 1930 - Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy on set 
of the film Brats (1930) (Image Credit: © Glasshouse/Entertainment Pictures). 
Credit line: Entertainment Pictures / Alamy Stock Photo.
Fig. 6. Image title: Brats (1930). Hal Roach film with Stan Laurel (left) and 
Oliver Hardy. Credit line: Pictorial Press Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo.
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no formal change between one and two (the original Stan and 
Ollie) and one and two (the mechanical reproduction of the first 
in Stan Jr. and Ollie Jr.). What changes in the repetition between 
the first double and its exact duplication that produces a comic 
effect? My answer is nothing. Nothing changes in the dialectical 
redoubling of the comic double. Nothing changes in three ways:
1) Nothing changes. In the movement from the first double 
to the second double there can be a change in form without a 
change in content (Being, Being ® Nothing, Nothing). Between 
Being and Nothing there is no change in content. There is also 
no change in content in the alternative formulation (Being, Noth-
ing ® Nothing, Being). Both the dialectical redoubling of the 
twins with the negative companions and the redoubling of the 
odd couple fail to bring about new content. 
2) Nothing changes. This is to say, nothing itself undergoes 
transformation. When the first duo is duplicated or mirrored in 
the second duo, the split (Hegel’s comma) between the first duo is 
itself repeated in the second split between the second duo. Nega-
tivity at first appears to be represented by the second figure who 
defuses the severity of the first one. However, when the double 
is repeated, negativity reveals itself to be between the first two. 
This becomes clear when the splice is repeated in the second two. 
What appears to be between two is already true of one.
3) Nothing changes. This is to say, the negativity that binds 
and separates Being and Nothing (and Being and Being) is the 
agent of change. The comma sets everything in motion. Nothing 
itself, represented by the comma, is in the position of the subject 
who in counting (to three) forgets to count herself (to be more 
exact, forgets to count herself as nothing).
The oscillation between Stan Jr. and Ollie Jr. highlights what 
should already be obvious in the relationship between Laurel 
and Hardy: the second does not make the first whole nor does 
the second overcome the first as the work of the negative, which 
only takes off in the redoubling. Instead, the two opposites are 
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somehow always already wrapped up in the other, because both 
are constituted by the crack that binds and separates them. There 
is no Laurel without Hardy, nor Hardy without Laurel. The ten-
sion between the two sustains both sides. It is precisely because 
each is bound to his distinct role that the severity and seriousness 
of the one has already crossed over into the lightness of the other. 
In turn, the frivolity of the second has already been sucked into 
the gravity of the first in the exact place where the second finds 
his lightness. What may be already obvious to us must become 
obvious to the double itself. As Stan says in one of his famous 
nonsensical proverbs, “You can lead a horse to water, but a pencil 
must be lead.” Ollie—the spirit of gravity—must get hit on the 
head with a block by the second set of doubles to realize Stan’s 
second accidental insight when he confuses himself and Ollie with 
their mini-mes. Stan scolds the boys, “If you don’t quiet down, 
we’ll have to send us to bed.” To which Ollie replies, “Not we! 
Them!” But Stan’s misspoken words are always closer to the truth.
Between the double and the redouble nothing changes, and 
for this very reason both the tension and the possibility of a comic 
eruption is heightened twice-two. The repetition of the deficiency 
in the first results in an excess. Comedy is not in the second rep-
etition but in the crack that makes Being and Nothing a game of 
“It” (“Not It!”). The comedy of spirit emerges when nothing itself 
changes, when the crack is split open by yet another crack in the 
doubling of the double: the transformation of negativity itself.
Bibliography
The American Dialect Society, “Word of the Year: 1993” https://www.
americandialect.org/woty/all-of-the-words-of-the-year-1990-to-
present#1993 (last accessed January 12, 2018).
Appel, Jr. Alfred (1971) “Conversations with Nabokov,” NOVEL: A 
Forum on Fiction 4, 3:209-22.
277
Twice Two: Hegel’s Comic Redoubling of Being and Nothing
Artaud, Antonin (1994) The Theater and its Double, trans. Mary Caro-
line Richards (New York: Grove Press).
Bergman, Ingmar, and Svensk Filmindustry (1957) The Seventh Seal 
(Acton, MA: Home Vision). 
Dolar, Mladen (2017) “Being and MacGuffin,” Crisis and Critique 4, 
1:82-101.
Freud, Sigmund (1999) “The Uncanny,” trans. James Strachey, The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud XVII:217-56 (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute 
of Psycho-Analysis).
Hegel, G.W.F. (1970) Phänomenologie des Geistes, in Werke, Vol. 3, ed. 
Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp).
––– (1986a) Wissenschaft der Logik I, in Werke, Vol. 5, ed. Eva Mold-
enhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).
––– (1986b) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II, in Werke, 
Vol. 17, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp).
Kubrick, Stanley, Stephen King, and Diane Johnson (1980) The Shining 
(Los Angelos: Warner Bros. Pictures).
Lacan, Jacques (2007) Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. 
Norton).
Marx, Karl (1956a) “Bemerkungen über die neueste preußische 
Zensurinstruktion,” in Marx-Engels-Werke, Vol. 1 (Berlin: Karl 
Dietz Verlag).
––– (1956b) “Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie,” in Marx-
Engels-Werke, Vol. 1 (Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag). 
––– (1960) “Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte,” Marx-
Engels-Werke, Vol. 8, 111-207 (Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag).
Roach, Hal, James Parrott, Stan Laurel, Oliver Hardy, Laurel and Hardy 
(1930) Brats (Culver City: Hal Roach Studios).
––– (1933a) Twice Two (Culver City: Hal Roach Studios).
––– (1933b) Sons of the Desert (Culver City: Hal Roach Studios).
Ruge, Arnold (1983) “Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ and the Politics of 
our Times,” trans. Lawrence S. Stepelevich, The Young Hegelians, 
211-36 (New York: Cambridge University Press).
278
Rachel Aumiller
Schroeder, Barbet, Don Roos, Jennifer Jason Leigh, Bridget Fonda, 
Howard Shore, and John Lutz (1992) Single White Female (Bur-
bank, CA: Columbia Pictures).
Shakespeare, William (1988) The Comedy of Errors (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press).
Stirner, Max (1983) “Art and Religion,” trans. Lawrence S. Stepelevich, 
The Young Hegelians, 327-53 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press).
Walt Disney Productions, Samuel Armstrong, and Lewis Carroll (1951) 
Walt Disney’s Alice in Wonderland (Racine, WI: Whitman).
Yarbrough, Jean, Budd Abbott, and Lou Costello (1945) The Naughty 
Nineties (Universal City, CA: Universal Studios).
Žižek, Slavoj (1991) “Why Should a Dialectician Learn to Count to 
Four,” Radical Philosophy 58:3-9.
Zupančič, Alenka (2008) The Odd One In: On Comedy (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press).
